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Developing Design as a Discipline 
 
Nigel Cross 
School of Engineering and Innovation, The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK. 
 
Abstract 
This is an invited paper reviewing my personal design research history, covering 50 
years of involvement since the mid-1960s. The focus of my research has shifted over 
time, from computer aided design and design methodology to design epistemology and 
design cognition. In CAD I assessed its effectiveness and implications for design 
professions, and how AI research in design might inform understanding of design 
cognition. In design methodology I developed a model that integrates procedural 
aspects of design process with structural aspects of design problems. In design 
epistemology I developed concepts of designerly ways of knowing and design as a 
discipline. In design cognition I conducted protocol studies of design activity and 
studied design expertise, and developed the concept of the co-evolution of problem and 
solution. A general progression in the work has been from aiding and supporting design 
practice towards more fundamental understanding of design as a discipline. 
Keywords: design cognition, design computing, design epistemology, design 
methodology, design research. 
 
 
Prologue 
In my senior years at school I studied mathematics and physics, and I was intending to 
be an engineer (thinking especially of automotive design engineering). On leaving 
school in 1960 I began an engineering apprenticeship as part of a Technology Diploma 
course in Mechanical Engineering at the (then) Bristol College of Science and 
Technology. I enjoyed the practical apprenticeship work, but I found the academic 
course very dull (much of it felt like repeating the maths and physics I had already 
studied at school). I think that I had expected an engineering course to include some 
designing, but it didn't. In the same college, a new architecture course had started a few 
years prior, and the architecture students seemed to be having a much more interesting 
and creative time! So I applied to enter the architecture course. Despite my lack of 
qualifications in art I was accepted, and started the following year. There, I discovered 
there was a lot of studio design time but little actual design teaching - we were given 
design projects to do, and the tutors then 'critiqued', or criticised, our designs. Although 
we were shown, and encouraged to look at, examples of good architecture, I thought it 
odd that we were never taught how to design. Since they were not teaching us how to 
design I didn't see how they could reasonably criticise our designing!  
Around 1963 I became aware of the new work in design methods, arising from the 1962 
Conference on Design Methods (Jones and Thornley, 1963), which I thought might 
offer a more rational approach to designing. For my final year 'Thesis Project' in the 
architecture course I chose to design a large (for the UK at that time) state secondary 
school. In designing the school, I tried to use Christopher Alexander's method for 'the 
synthesis of form' (Alexander, 1964), but found I could not even start to compose the 
requirements statements that it needed, let alone do the detailed linking work between 
them. I knew someone at the other school of architecture in Bristol who was doing 
postgraduate work in CAD, including floorplan-layout programs, and I asked him to 
produce a basic 'least circulation cost' layout of the main accommodation groups that I 
had defined for the school. It didn't really have much influence on the final design, but 
the computer-produced layout gave me a sort of rational design starting-point. I had 
overcome some of my concerns about 'how to' design, and I got a very good final 'crit' 
assessment for my project. At the start of that final year (1965-66), the College was 
being reorganised and upgraded into Bath University of Technology. As a result, we 
final-year architecture students were told we would get a BSc degree rather than the 
previous Diploma. That was lucky for me, because it gave me the entry requirement for 
the Masters course in Industrial Design Technology run by J. Christopher Jones at the 
University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology (UMIST). I went to the 
course because I wanted to learn more in the new topics such as design methods and 
computing, but the course was also a good general research training. 
From there, I went on to an academic career, with my research interests gradually 
developing from helping to support design through CAD and design methods, towards 
investigating and understanding more fully 'how to design', and the nature of design 
thinking and design expertise. I have grouped aspects this work into four themes in the 
following sections: design computing, design methodology, design epistemology, and 
design cognition. 
 
1. Design Computing 
My first research project was my MSc project at UMIST in 1967 on 'Simulation of 
Computer Aided Design'. This was based on a novel and strange idea that we might get 
some insights into what CAD might be like, and what the design requirements for CAD 
systems might be, by attempting to simulate the use of CAD facilities, which at that 
time were mostly hypotheses and suggestions for future systems that hardly anyone 
really knew how to develop (Sutherland's seminal but very basic 'Sketchpad' interactive 
system had only been developed in 1963). The strangeness in this idea was that these 
simulations could be effected through getting human beings to pretend to be the 
computers. This was a kind of reverse application of the 'Turing Test' for artificial 
intelligence, and which later became known as a 'Wizard of Oz' research method in 
human-computer interaction design. 
The project was based on asking designers (architects) to attempt a small design project 
in experimental conditions. They were given the design brief, and asked to produce a 
sketch design. As well as conventional drawing materials, they had a simulated 
computer system to help them: they could write questions on cards located in front of a 
closed-circuit TV camera, and would receive written answers (or even drawings) on a 
TV screen in front of them. In another room, at the other end of the CCTV link, was a 
small team of architects and building engineers who attempted to answer the designer's 
questions. Thus we had a very crude simulation of some features of what might be parts 
of a CAD system, such as expert systems and databases. The designers who participated 
in these experiments were not told what to expect from the 'computer', nor given any 
constraints on the kinds of facilities they might choose to ask of it. I hoped to discover 
what kinds of facilities and features might be required of future CAD systems, and gain 
some insights into the behavioural patterns that might emerge in these future human-
computer systems. 
I conducted ten such experiments, each of which lasted about one hour. The messages 
between designer and 'computer' were recorded, and one of the analyses I made was to 
classify them into the topics to which they referred, from the client’s brief to 
construction details. This kind of data gave some insight into the designers' patterns of 
activity. The number of messages sent in each experiment was quite low, with normally 
several minutes elapsing between requests from the designer. Of course, the response 
time from the 'computer' could also be quite long, typically of the order of 30 seconds. 
Despite this slow and apparently easy pace of interaction, in de-briefing interviews all 
the designers reported that they found the experiments hard work and stressful. They 
reported the main benefit of using the 'computer' as being an increased speed of work, 
principally by reducing uncertainty (i.e. they relatively quickly received answers to 
queries, which they accepted as reliable information). 
I also tried a few variations from my standard experiments. The most interesting of 
these was to reverse the normal set of expectations of the functions of the designer and 
the 'computer'. The 'computer' was given the job of having to produce a design, to the 
satisfaction of the observing designer. It was immediately apparent that in this situation 
there was no stress on the designer - in fact, it became quite fun - and it was the 
'computer' that found the experience to be hard work. This led me to conclude in my 
dissertation that CAD system designers should aim for an active, rather than a passive 
role for the computer: 
The computer should be asking questions of the designer, seeking from him those decisions 
which it is not competent to handle itself. The computer could be doing all the drawing 
work, with the designer instructing amendments … We should be moving towards giving the 
machine a sufficient degree of intelligent behaviour, and a corresponding increase in 
participation in the design process, to liberate the designer from routine procedures and to 
enhance his decision-making role. 
Unfortunately, 50 years later, I don't think that vision has yet been accomplished, 
although current parametric CAD modelling in architecture, allied with advances in 
structural engineering, does seem to have allowed architects (for better or worse) to 
exercise more freedom of imagination in what can be designed and built. 
My studies had suggested that using computers in design might have adverse effects, 
such as inducing stress, on designers. The only positive effect that CAD appeared to 
have was to speed up the design process. The potential negative effects of CAD that I 
identified were an intensification of the designer’s work rate and a concomitant 
reduction in the person-power required in design offices (Figure 1). But on the other 
hand I suggested that CAD in architecture might lead to better communication between 
members of the design team, and to the inclusion of a wider range of participants, such 
as the building's users (Cross, 1972a). This potential of CAD for de-professionalising 
the design process, allowing laypeople to design for themselves, using 'architecture 
machines' (Negroponte, 1970), featured strongly amongst contributions to the 
proceedings of the first international conference of the Design Research Society, on 
Design Participation, which Chris Jones, Reg Talbot and I organised in 1971 (Cross, 
1972b). 
 
 
Figure 1 
A cartoon by Louis Hellman illustrating the comment in my article in The Architect's Journal on the 
impact of computers on architectural design: 'It can now be seen that savings will be made at middle 
management level which, in an architectural practice, is probably at the level of, or just below, job 
architect.' (Cross, 1972a) [Louis Hellman/RIBA Collections] 
 
Nevertheless, I also still had a largely positive belief that computers might produce 
designs that are somehow better - more efficient, or more elegant, or something - than 
designs produced by humans. I continued research on investigating the issue of human 
and machine roles in computer aided design for my PhD (Cross, 1974). Drawing on 
research in problem solving (of the 'travelling salesman' route-layout type) at the 
pioneering artificial intelligence centre at Edinburgh University, I expected that human-
machine interaction could produce design solutions that were better than either a human 
or a machine could produce alone. So I tested that hypothesis, using the problem of 
efficient room layouts in a building plan. I devised experiments in which fully-
automatic computer programs, un-aided designers, and designers aided by interactive 
layout programs tackled the same layout problems. 
I fully expected to replicate the Edinburgh results in favour of effective problem-solving 
through human-machine interaction, and was genuinely surprised to find that (a) there 
were no significant differences between the performances (i.e. the efficiency of the 
layouts) of un-aided designers and automatic computer programs, and (b) human-
machine interaction produced worse results than either un-aided humans or automatic 
machines! There were some strong mitigating circumstances arising from the crude 
nature of the human-machine interaction that was possible at that time (teletype 
terminals and storage-tube displays), but nevertheless it was a surprising result, that 
shook my confidence in CAD developments at that time, and led me to the conclusion 
that computer aided design might actually make design results worse, rather than better. 
In expanding my thesis for publication in book form (Cross, 1977a), I concluded that 
CAD would be of very limited positive effectiveness as a design aid, but could have 
profound negative effects on design activity and the job of being a designer. In an 
article in the Journal of the Royal Institute of British Architects, I confessed that ‘I have 
seen the future; and it doesn’t work!’ (Cross, 1977b) 
However, the developments in computing and CAD throughout the 1980s made me 
realise that, for good or bad, using computers in design practice was inevitable (indeed 
was already becoming ubiquitous), although I continued to be dubious about the 
personal and social impacts of computers within design. In some of my research I also 
found that computational models of design activity can be useful descriptive or 
explanatory models of human design behaviour. This has been particularly so in the 
field of creative design, where attempts to build computational models have provided 
some useful paradigms for the nature of creative design activity. 
In 1998 John Gero invited me to join an international workshop celebrating 30 years of 
design computing at the University of Sydney, Australia. I still had some doubts about 
the personal and social impacts of computer use within the design professions, and so I 
chose to reflect on the question 'Can a machine design?'. I suggested that 
We might not necessarily want machines to do everything that human beings do, but setting 
challenges for machines to do some of the cognitively hard things that people do should give 
us insight into those things and into the broader nature of human cognitive abilities. I had 
always assumed that this argument was one of the validations for research in artificial 
intelligence. Thus we would learn more about ourselves. For example, the research 
programme in computer chess playing has presumably not had the ultimate aim of making it 
unnecessary for humans ever to 'need' to play chess again. Rather, it has been to gain 
understanding of the nature of the 'problem' of the chess game itself, and of the nature of the 
human cognitive processes which are brought to bear in chess playing and in the resolution 
of chess problems. (Cross, 2001a, p. 48-49) 
I concluded that 
[R]esearch in artificial intelligence should always address the question, 'What are we 
learning from this research about how people think?' Similarly, our computer-design 
research should attempt to tell us something about how designers think. I believe we can 
learn some important things about the nature of human design cognition through looking at 
design from the computational perspective … For me, the value of asking the question 'Can a 
machine design?' is that it begs the corollary question, 'How do people design?' (Cross, 
2001a, p. 50) 
The important question for me was really 'What is it that people are doing when they are 
doing design?' My work in design computing had begun with attempts to create more 
efficient and rational design processes in architecture, but had moved towards a view 
that computerisation of architectural design might introduce more efficiency in design 
practice but would have little positive effect on the quality of the end product, and could 
well have detrimental effects on the job satisfaction of architects. I had also realised (as 
had others who had been involved in the early developments) that there was much more 
involved in designing good architecture than producing 'efficient' plans. My interests 
moved from assisting design through CAD and artificial intelligence to seeking to 
understand more about the 'natural intelligence' of design thinking (Cross, 1999) and the 
creative skills of designers. I was still bothered about 'how to design'. 
 
2. Design Methodology 
In 1970, I joined Chris Jones at the new UK Open University (OU), where he had been 
appointed to the Chair of Design in the Technology Faculty. The small academic 
departments that were set up initially in the OU were called 'Disciplines', so we were the 
Design Discipline and were faced for the first time with the challenge of developing 
design as a discipline. At the same time, we had to face the challenge of conducting 
design education at a distance, through the media of TV, radio and print, and in a 
context of general, mass education, rather than the selective, profession-orientated, 
studio-based education of traditional design schools. 
Chris Jones had just published his book Design Methods: Seeds of Human Futures 
(Jones, 1970), which not only provided a textbook of methods but also an expanded 
view of design as a broad, futures-creating activity. In producing our first design 
courses, this work proved apposite: design methods externalised some of the activities 
of designing and could be taught in an explicit way, and a broader, non-profession-
orientated view of design was relevant in the context of the OU, where students were 
not studying for a specific, professional qualification. One of the first teaching texts I 
produced for the OU, with Robin Roy (another ex-student of Chris Jones), was a Design 
Methods Manual (Cross and Roy, 1975), which was also well-received outside the OU, 
and I still get people in the design world telling me how influential it was for them. 
At conferences of the Design Research Society in the late 1970s and early 1980s I 
realised that a new generation of researchers was appearing, who had only limited 
awareness of the origins of design research and methods. This was not surprising, 
because the development of the field up until then had been conducted primarily 
through conferences and isolated research papers. For newcomers, there was no easy 
way by which they could become familiar with the field and its history of development. 
So I put together a reader of Developments in Design Methodology (Cross, 1984) 
covering what I considered to be the important, influential papers from the first 20 years 
of that development since the 1962 Conference on Design Methods. 
As I noted in the introduction to the reader, to prepare such a book on design 
methodology at that time 'would seem to be either a very brave or foolish thing to do', 
because during the 1970s there had been a backlash against methodology (including 
even from leading design methodologists, such as Alexander and Jones) and 
'methodologists are reviled as impoverished creatures who merely study, rather than 
practise, a particular art or science'. Part of the distrust of methodology might arise from 
an ambiguity in the use of the word. In the sense of 'a methodology' it can be used to 
mean a particular, prescribed, rigid approach, of which practitioners are usually 
sceptical. But the broader, and more correct sense of the word is to mean the general 
study of method. Anyone who wishes to reflect on how they practise their art or science 
(or designing), and anyone who teaches others to practise, must draw on methodology. 
Design methodology therefore is the study of the principles, practices and procedures of 
design in a rather broad and general sense. Its central concern is with how designing 
both is and might be conducted. This concern therefore includes the study of how 
designers work and think, the establishment of appropriate structures for the design 
process, the development and application of new design methods, techniques and 
procedures, and reflection on the nature and extent of design knowledge and its 
application to design problems. 
I went on to publish another book on Engineering Design Methods (Cross, 1989; now in 
its 4th edition, 2008). The book was designed to be more than a manual of procedures; 
there was also discussion of the principles, processes and practice of design. Individual 
methods are presented in the book as tactics, to be used selectively within an informed, 
strategic approach for designing successful products. Many designers are suspicious of 
design methods, fearing that they are a 'straitjacket', stifling creativity. This is a 
misunderstanding of the intention of design methods, which are meant to improve the 
quality of design decisions, and hence of the end product. Both creative methods and 
rational methods are complementary aspects of an informed approach to design. Rather 
than a 'straitjacket', they should be seen as a 'lifejacket', helping the designer, especially 
the student designer, to keep afloat in the complex currents of a design project. 
In the book, the use of design methods is structured around a process framework that 
matches problem finding with solution generating. This is a hybrid model that attempts 
to integrate the predominantly prescriptive, linear, rational models of engineering 
design with the descriptive, spiralling, cognitive models developed in industrial design 
and architecture (as discussed in Cross and Roozenburg, 1992). This model (Figure 2) 
assumes a symmetrical, commutative relationship between problem and solution, and 
between sub-problems and sub-solutions, but recognising also that there should be some 
logical progression from problem to sub-problems and from sub-solutions to solution. 
 
Figure 2 
This model of designing integrates the procedural aspects of design with the structural aspects of design 
problems. The procedural aspects are represented by the sequence of eight methods (anti-clockwise, in 
the inner loop, from the top), and the structural aspects are represented by the arrows showing the 
commutative relationship between problem and solution and the hierarchical relationships between 
problem/sub-problems and between sub-solutions/solution. (Cross, 2008) 
 
Although intended primarily for students of engineering and industrial product design, I 
wrote in the introduction to my design methods book that I hoped it might also be useful 
'as an introduction to design for the many teachers and practitioners in engineering who 
found this subject sadly lacking in their own education' (as I did, at the beginning of the 
1960s, in my own brief introductory education in engineering). 
For a conference in 1992 I wrote a paper (Cross, 1993) reviewing the history of design 
methodology and its relationship with science. The origins of design methods in the 
1950s and '60s had lain in 'scientific' methods of planning and management, such as 
decision theory and operations research. I distinguished between three science-design 
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relationships: scientific design, design science and a science of design. The reasons 
advanced for developing new methods of design were often based on an assumption that 
modern, industrial design had become too complex for intuitive methods. The 
originators of the design methods movement of the 1960s realised that there had been a 
change from pre-industrial design to industrial design - and perhaps even to post-
industrial design. The first half of the 20th century had also seen the rapid growth of 
scientific underpinnings in many types of design, such as materials science, engineering 
science, building science, and behavioural science. So I suggested that all modern, 
industrialised design (as distinct from pre-industrial, craft-orientated design) is scientific 
design, based on scientific knowledge but utilising a mix of both intuitive and non-
intuitive design methods. 
A desire to 'scientise' design can also be traced further back to ideas in the modern 
movement of design in the 1920s, but the term 'design science' became especially 
associated with the originators of the ICED conferences, the Workshop Design 
Konstruction (WDK) or The International Society for Design Science (now The Design 
Society). The concern to develop something that could be regarded as design science 
led some to attempts to formulate the design method - a single rationalised method, 
based on formal languages and theories. This is extending beyond 'scientific design' to 
include systematic knowledge of design process and methodology as well as the 
scientific/technological underpinnings of the design of artefacts. So I suggested that 
design science refers to an explicitly organised, rational and wholly systematic approach 
to design; not just the utilisation of scientific knowledge of artefacts, but design in some 
sense as a scientific activity itself. 
This view of a design science remains controversial in some quarters, especially those 
in which design is seen as different from but equal to science as a human activity. This 
different view embraces the development of a 'science of design', which seeks to 
understand and improve designing but without it having to be channelled into a 
technical-rational, scientific activity. In this view, therefore, the science of design is the 
study of design - something similar to what I defined as 'design methodology': the study 
of the principles, practices and procedures of design. So I concluded that the science of 
design refers to that body of work which attempts to improve our understanding of 
design through scientific (i.e., systematic, reliable) methods of investigation. 
In his book The Sciences of the Artificial, Herbert Simon laid out a positivist, technical-
rational view of design theory and practice, but he also went so far as to say that ‘the 
proper study of mankind is the science of design’ (Simon, 1969, p. 83).  (The phrase is a 
corruption of the line ‘the proper study of mankind is man’ in an 18th century poem by 
Alexander Pope.) What Simon was suggesting was that a science of design could be a 
fundamental, interdisciplinary and integrative study, and furthermore 'not only as the 
professional component of a technical education but as a core discipline for every 
liberally educated man' (ibid.). (Presumably he meant, and should have written, 'every 
liberally educated person'.) It is this fundamental view of a science of design, reaching 
across all domains of design, and relevant and accessible to all, that underlies my work 
in understanding the nature of design thinking and practice. 
 
3. Design Epistemology 
As well as the establishment of the Open University, the 1970s saw another important, 
widening development of design education in the UK, as it gradually became adopted as 
a subject within secondary schools. Bruce Archer, one of the other pioneers of design 
methodology with Alexander and Jones (Archer, 1965), became deeply involved in this 
development, and set up a new Design Education Unit alongside his Design Research 
Department at the Royal College of Art, London, to help develop the theory and 
practice of design education. He also obtained funding from the UK government for a 
research project around 'Design in General Education', with a goal 'to provide the means 
for achieving a level of design awareness in the general community analogous to 
literacy and numeracy' (Archer, 1979a). This was the radical view of design as 'a third 
area of education', alongside, and equal with, sciences and humanities, which Archer 
had outlined earlier in a 1976 speech on 'The Three Rs'.  
These developments of design in general education chimed well with our task at the OU 
of creating a non-professional education in design, and also provided some support for 
the concept of design as a discipline. I began a research programme on design 
epistemology, seeking in particular to link research and theory in design methods and 
processes with fundamental educational principles and theory. In this, I was helped 
considerably by my wife, Anita Clayburn Cross, an educationalist who also worked 
with Bruce Archer at the RCA. Anita contributed particularly on identifying the 
intrinsic values of design education and the concept of a design intelligence (Cross, A. 
C., 1984, 1986). At the same time, within the Design Research Society I had been 
working with others to set up a journal of design research, which launched in 1979 as 
Design Studies. As one of the editors, I initiated a series of articles on the theme of 
'Design as a Discipline', as a means of helping to promote, understand and articulate the 
concept. In the first issue of the journal we reprinted Archer's 'The Three Rs' speech as 
the first in the series (Archer, 1979b). The second in the series was 'A Timeline Theory 
of Planning and Design' by Gerald Nadler (Nadler, 1980). For the third, I wrote 
'Designerly Ways of Knowing' (Cross, 1982). 
This paper, which built on Archer's work at the RCA and our work at the OU, 
developed the criteria that design must satisfy to be acceptable as a part of general 
education, and to stand as an independent 'third area'. Such an acceptance would imply a 
reorientation from the instrumental aims of conventional, professionally-orientated 
design education, towards intrinsic values of design as a valid subject of study for 
everyone. These intrinsic values, I argued, must derive from the deep, underlying 
patterns of how designers think and act. Because they share a common concern with 
these fundamental 'ways of knowing', both design research and design education could 
jointly contribute to developing design as a discipline. I also suggested that this 
emerging view of 'designerly ways of knowing' could form an axiomatic ‘touch-stone 
theory’ for research within design as a discipline.  
The 1980s saw a significant shift in perspectives on design thinking, from criticising the 
apparent limitations of design practice to recognising the inherent strengths and 
potential of design cognition, or 'how designers think' (Lawson, 1980). In particular, 
Donald Schön established his theory of reflective practice as a counter to the theory of 
technical rationality as the predominant, or preferred approach to resolving practical 
problems (Schön, 1983). Schön sought a new 'epistemology of practice' that would help 
explain and account for how competent practitioners actually engage with their practice 
– a 'kind of knowing' which is different from the knowledge conventionally found in 
textbooks. In his analysis of the case studies across different professions (including 
architecture and engineering) that provided the examples for his theory, he began with 
the assumption that 'competent practitioners usually know more than they can say. They 
exhibit a kind of knowing-in-practice, most of which is tacit.' He identified a cognitive 
process of reflection-in-action as the intelligence that guides ‘intuitive’ behaviour in 
practical contexts of thinking-and-acting. 
For my inaugural lecture as Professor of Design Studies at the Open University in 1989, 
I prepared a paper on 'The Nature and Nurture of Design Ability' (Cross, 1990). The 
first part of the paper concentrated on the nature of design ability, for which I drew 
upon previous studies of design activity and designer behaviour. In the second part of 
the paper I argued that understanding the nature of design ability is necessary in order to 
enable design educators to nurture its development in their students. I summarised 
design ability as comprising abilities of resolving ill-defined problems, adopting 
solution-focussed cognitive strategies, employing abductive or appositional thinking 
and using non-verbal modelling media. These abilities are highly developed in skilled 
designers, but they are also possessed in some degree by everyone, and therefore can 
and should be part of everyone's education. I went on to outline a case for design ability 
as a fundamental form of human intelligence, thus seeking to provide a much broader 
foundation for establishing the concept of 'designerly ways of knowing'.  
This interpretation of design thinking as a form of intelligence was based on the work of 
psychologist Howard Gardner. Gardner's view is that there is not just one form of 
intelligence (as conventionally identified in standard forms of 'intelligence tests'), but 
several, relatively autonomous human intellectual competences (Gardner, 1983). He 
distinguished six forms of intelligence: 
linguistic 
logical-mathematical 
spatial 
musical 
bodily-kinaesthetic 
personal. 
Aspects of design ability are found spread throughout these various forms of 
intelligence in a way that does not always seem entirely satisfactory. For example, 
spatial abilities in problem-solving (including thinking 'in the mind’s eye') were 
classified by Gardner under spatial intelligence, whereas many other aspects of practical 
problem-solving ability (including examples from engineering) were classified under 
bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence. So in this classification, for example, the inventor’s 
competence is placed together with that of the dancer and the actor, which doesn't seem 
appropriate. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to try to separate out design ability as 
a form of intelligence in its own right. 
Gardner's criteria for the recognition of a distinct form of intelligence were as follows: 
Potential isolation by brain damage. 
The existence of idiots savants, prodigies and other exceptional individuals. 
An identifiable core operation or set of operations. 
A distinctive developmental history, and a definable set of expert, end-state 
performances. 
An evolutionary history. 
Susceptibility to encoding in a symbol system. 
Support from experimental psychological tasks. 
In my inaugural lecture, I summarised some of the evidence for design intelligence 
against these criteria, and I concluded that, 'If asked to judge the case for design 
intelligence on this set of criteria, we might have to conclude that the case is "not 
proven". Whilst there is good evidence to meet most of the criteria, on some there is a 
lack of substantial or reliable evidence.' Thirty years later we actually have much more 
of that evidence, thanks to the growth of design research with a focus on design 
thinking. This research includes evidence for 'isolation by brain damage' (Goel and 
Grafman, 2000), work on the 'core operations' (e.g. Gero, 1990; Lawson, 1994; Dorst 
and Cross, 2001; Dong, 2009), on 'expert performance' (e.g. Bucciarelli, 1994; Cross 
and Clayburn Cross, 1998; Cross, 2004; Lawson and Dorst, 2009), on 'symbol systems' 
(e.g. Goldschmidt, 1991; Schön and Wiggins, 1992; Goel, 1995; Purcell, 1998), and on 
protocol studies and other 'experimental psychological tasks' (e.g. Cross, 2001b; Visser, 
2006; Alexiou et al., 2009). 
Whatever the current strength of the case may be, viewing design thinking as a form of 
intelligence seems to me to be a productive view; it helps to identify and clarify features 
of the nature of design thinking, and it offers a framework for understanding and 
developing design ability through design education. A view of design thinking as a 
distinct form of intelligence does not necessarily mean that some people 'have it' and 
some people do not. Design ability is something that everyone has, to some extent, 
because it is embedded in our brains as an evolved cognitive function. Like other forms 
of intelligence and ability it may be possessed, or may be manifested in performance, at 
higher levels by some people than by others. And like other forms of intelligence and 
ability, design intelligence is not simply a given 'talent' or 'gift', but can be trained and 
developed. 
Much of my work in design epistemology was brought together in the book Designerly 
Ways of Knowing (Cross, 2006, 2007). The book traces the development of the research 
programme over a period of some 20 years, from the 'Designerly Ways of Knowing' 
paper of 1982 to a more fully developed argument for 'Design as a Discipline', based on 
a science of design, for a design research conference in 2000 (Cross, 2001c). A key 
insight for me at the start of this programme was to realise that if we wanted to develop 
a robust, independent discipline of design (rather than let design be subsumed within 
paradigms of science or the arts), then we had to be much more confident and 
knowledgeable about the particular nature and qualities of design activity, design 
knowledge, and design cognition. 
 
4. Design Cognition 
In 1990 I joined the Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering at Delft University of 
Technology as Professor of Design Methodology. There, I was to work closely with 
Norbert Roozenburg, who was just completing his own book on design methodology, 
Produktontwerpen: Structuur en Methoden, which I was able to help get published in an 
English language version (Roozenburg and Eekels, 1995).  
In one of our first collaborations, Norbert and I developed a proposal for a workshop on 
'Research in Design Thinking', to bring together research in both design cognition and 
computational modelling of design processes - i.e. studies of the natural and the 
artificial intelligence of design. The workshop brought together about a dozen 
researchers from The Netherlands, Germany, the UK and the USA, and was held in 
Delft in May 1991. The workshop and its proceedings (Cross, Dorst and Roozenburg, 
1992) launched the beginning of a new phase of research for me in designerly ways of 
knowing and the science of design. It also launched a number of further workshops and 
conferences that became the series of Design Thinking Research Symposia (DTRS). 
Kees Dorst and Henri Christiaans, who were both working on protocol studies of 
designer behaviour for their PhDs at Delft, returned from presenting a joint paper at the 
ASME Design Methodology conference in the USA in 1992 with a proposal for another 
workshop. The proposal had originated at the ASME meeting in their discussions with 
David Radcliffe (University of Queensland, Australia) and Scott Minneman (Xerox 
Palo Alto Research Center, USA). The idea was to use facilities at Xerox PARC to 
video-record experiments with both individual designers and small teams tackling the 
same design problem, and then invite researchers around the world to analyse these 
recordings and present their studies at another workshop to be held in Delft. The Faculty 
of Industrial Design Engineering again gave financial support, and Xerox PARC 
provided the facilities; Larry Leifer and his engineering design group at Stanford 
University in Palo Alto also provided contacts with local designers who volunteered to 
be our experiment participants. Kees and Henri worked up the design of the experiment, 
including the design brief and background information for 'a device for carrying a 
backpack on a mountain bike', and we spent a week at Xerox PARC in January 1994 
conducting and recording the experiments with Scott Minneman and his colleague Steve 
Harrison. From the half-dozen sessions we ran, we selected the recordings of one 
individual designer (the engineering designer Victor Scheinman from Stanford) and one 
team of three (product designers from the IDEO design consultancy in Palo Alto) as the 
common data sets. The international workshop held in Delft later that year became the 
'Delft Protocols Workshop', with some 20 papers being presented. That meeting, and the 
book of proceedings on Analysing Design Activity (Cross, Christiaans and Dorst, 1996), 
firmly established both a programme of research in design thinking and protocol 
analysis as a principal research method. 
At the workshop, Ömer Akin, from Carnegie Mellon University, expressed the view 
that it had been a great success and that he would like to organise another - which he 
did, in Istanbul in 1996 on 'Descriptive Models of Design'. And so a series of meetings 
had started, and also the informal way in which it has continued, with each meeting 
somehow generating a proposal for the next. It was Gabi Goldschmidt and William 
Porter who coined the generic name 'Design Thinking Research Symposia' (DTRS), at 
the next meeting, at MIT in 1999. The eleventh Design Thinking Research Symposium, 
held in Denmark in 2016, marked the 25th anniversary of the start of the symposium 
series. So the series started rather by accident, and also continued by a rather accidental 
process of enthusiasm for 'what next?' and the creativity and goodwill of volunteers 
intent on making it happen. But overlaying its accidental nature there has been serious 
academic purpose and a concern for ensuring good research that helps knowledge to 
grow and disseminate. Together, the organisers and participants created an international 
'invisible college' to promote and sustain research in design thinking. The DTRS series 
has produced a substantial set of publications in books and journals (see Cross, 2018a), 
with significant research results, and has helped to generate and foster a community of 
scholars and researchers with interests in design cognition. 
One of my own pieces of research arose from the Delft Protocols Workshop, in an 
analysis of how creative thinking happens in design. The conventional idea of a 
'creative leap', in which a novel concept emerges quite suddenly as a potential design 
solution, is widely regarded as a characteristic feature of creative design. My analysis 
(Cross, 1997) was based on an example of a key creative moment that occurred during 
the design team's work, when one of the team members proposed a 'plastic tray' concept 
for the device, which became the basis of their final design. I concluded, from the 
evidence for the development of that key moment, that the cognitive act underlying 
creative insight in design is not so much taking a 'leap', from problem to solution, but 
more akin to proposing a 'bridging' structure between problem space and solution space. 
Such a 'creative bridge' creates a resolution between the unfolding design requirements 
and the emerging design structure of a potential new product. 
Kees Dorst and I developed this idea further in a later paper (Dorst and Cross, 2001), 
based on the series of protocol studies that Kees undertook with experienced industrial 
designers, all tackling the same problem. In this paper, we applied a prior AI model 
(from Maher and Poon, 1996) of the co-evolution of problem/solution spaces to our 
observations of the designers. We modelled creative design in terms of the bridging of 
problem and solution spaces and their co-evolution within the design process towards a 
matching pair. Figure 3 models what we observed in the experiments.  
The co-evolution model fits well with the abductive or appositional nature of design 
thinking, in that it embodies the building of emergent relationships between problem 
and solution. This paper established the concept of co-evolution as a significant 
distinguishing feature of creative design activity, and it has been used subsequently by 
many other design researchers. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
A model of the co-evolution of problem and solution in design. Designers start by exploring the problem 
space (PS), and find, discover, or recognise a partial structure (P(t+1)). That partial structure is then used 
to provide them with a partial structuring of the solution space (SS) (S(t+1)). They consider the 
implications of the partial structure within the SS, use it to generate some initial ideas for the form of a 
design concept, and so extend and develop the partial structuring (S(t+2)). They transfer the developed 
partial solution structure back into the PS (P(t+2)), and again consider implications and extend the 
structuring of the PS. Their goal is to create a matching problem-solution pair. (Dorst and Cross, 2001) 
 
These kinds of studies were part of a programme of trying to understand the design 
strategies of experienced and even outstanding designers. Previously, most studies of 
designer behaviour had been based on novices (e.g. students) or, at best, designers of 
relatively modest talents. The reason for this, of course, is that it is easier to obtain such 
people as subjects for study. However, if studies of designer behaviour are limited to 
studies of rather inexpert designers, then it is also obvious that our understanding of 
expertise in design will also be limited. In order to understand expertise in design, we 
must study expert designers and, if possible, study exceptionally good designers. 
Problem-Space
Dimension
Solution-Space
Dimension
P(t) P(t+1)
S(t) S(t+1) S(t+2)
P(t+2)
P(t)       initial problem space
P(t+1)  partial structuring of problem space
S(t)      initial solution space
S(t+1)  partial structuring of solution space
S(t+2) developed structuring of solution space
P(t+2) developed structuring of problem space
One such outstanding designer was the engineer Victor Scheinman, whom we had the 
good fortune to obtain as a participant in the Delft Protocols study. Another two to 
whom I had privileged access were personal friends, Gordon Murray, the Formula One 
race car designer, and Kenneth Grange, the industrial product designer. Both of these 
are outstanding designers in their fields, and both were willing to talk about and 
demonstrate their design tactics and strategies. These three expert designers have 
featured in a number of papers directed towards investigating the nature of design 
expertise (Cross and Clayburn Cross, 1998; Cross, 2002). There appear to be several 
striking similarities in the creative strategies exercised by these designers working 
across very different fields, which suggest that a common understanding, and indeed a 
general model might be constructed of high level, creative strategies in design. I 
developed a general descriptive model from the examples (Figure 4), showing how 
strategic knowledge in creative design is exercised at three levels: low level articulated 
knowledge of first principles, an intermediate level of tacit personal and situated 
knowledge applied within the particular problem and its context, and high level implicit 
and explicit knowledge of problem goals and criteria. All three outstanding designers 
that I studied seem to exercise this strategic knowledge in similar ways in creating novel 
design proposals. In summary, creative design begins with a tension between the 
problem goals and criteria for a satisfactory solution; this is resolved by matching a 
problem frame with a solution concept; which is achieved by drawing on relevant first 
principles. 
 
 
Figure 4 
A model that generalises the strategic approaches found in the work of outstanding designers. At the 
lower level is knowledge of first principles, which may be domain specific or more general scientific 
knowledge. At the intermediate level is where strategic knowledge is especially exercised, and where that 
knowledge is more variable, situated in the particular problem and its context, tacit and perhaps 
personalised and idiosyncratic. At the higher level there is a mix of relatively stable, but usually implicit 
goals held by the designer, the temporary problem goals, and explicit solution criteria specified by the 
client or other domain authority. (Cross, 2002) 
 
I also wrote a paper that provided an overview of what had been learned from protocol 
and other empirical studies of design activity, and summarised results relevant to 
understanding the nature of design cognition from an interdisciplinary, domain-
independent perspective (Cross, 2001b). The results were presented grouped into three 
major aspects of design cognition – the formulation of problems, the generation of 
solutions, and the utilisation of design process strategies. I drew parallels and 
comparisons between results, and found many similarities of design cognition across 
domains of professional practice. Perhaps the most interesting conclusion was that it 
seems that the 'intuitive' behaviour (actually, experienced behaviour) of designers is 
often highly appropriate to the special nature of design tasks, although appearing to be 
'unprincipled' (or unsystematic) in theory.  
In 2003 Ernest Edmonds offered to host one of the DTRS series at the University of 
Technology, Sydney, Australia, specifically focused on expertise in design, for which I 
prepared a review paper on expertise in general and especially expertise in design 
(Cross, 2004). In doing this, I was returning to the concept of 'designerly ways of 
knowing' and attempting to understand and articulate what constitutes the particular 
nature of expertise in design. Much of my work on design cognition is brought together 
in the book Design Thinking: Understanding how designers think and work (Cross, 
2011). 
I have continued to develop an evidence-based understanding of design expertise, 
recently contributing a chapter on 'Expertise in Professional Design' to the Cambridge 
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. In that chapter I concluded that 
Expert designers appear to be 'ill-behaved' problem solvers, e.g. in that they do not devote 
extensive time and attention to defining the problem. However, it seems that this may well 
be appropriate behaviour, since some studies have suggested that over-concentration on 
problem definition does not necessarily lead to successful design outcomes. It appears that 
successful design behaviour is based not on extensive problem analysis, but on adequate 
'problem scoping' and on a focused or directed approach to gathering problem information, 
prioritising criteria and generating solution concepts. Setting and changing goals, rather than 
sticking to the problem as given, are inherent elements of design activity.  
Expert designers perform in ways akin to other professionals … dealing with practical 
situations of uncertainty, inadequate information and unclear goals … Like other 
professional decision makers, expert designers do not work from 'intuition' but have 
recognisable and appropriate strategies for dealing with their ill-defined problems, as 
research in understanding design expertise has shown. (Cross, 2018b, p. 386) 
Perhaps finally I have begun to understand a little more about 'how to design'!  
The general progression of my work, from design computing and methodology to 
design epistemology and cognition, has been a development from aiding and improving 
design practice towards a more fundamental understanding of the nature of skilled 
design practice. This progression began from a pragmatic necessity to explore the 
concept of design as a discipline, because I had been appointed to something called the 
‘Design Discipline’ at the Open University. At that time (and probably still today) there 
were people who were adamant  that ‘design is not a discipline’, but I believe it now to 
be widely accepted that design is developing strongly as an academic discipline, as well 
as a professional practice. It was following the idea of design as a discipline that led me 
into studies of how designers think and work. The later studies of expert and 
outstanding designers have been a fundamental personal re-orientation away from the 
early design science of CAD and design methodology towards a science of design based 
on design epistemology, cognition and praxiology, necessary to underpin design as a 
discipline. My guiding principle has been that the design community must be able to 
hold a defensible, evidence-based, core paradigm of designerly ways of knowing, 
thinking and acting. 
 
Epilogue 
Looking back over 50 years of my involvement in design research, the achievements 
seem to be rather modest. But younger design researchers today must find it difficult to 
imagine our field as it was in the early 1960s, as the new approaches and attitudes to 
design began to appear. There were none of the journals we now have; no design 
research conferences; no Design Research Society nor Design Society; no PhD 
programmes in design; no concept of design as a discipline; even no design in 
engineering education! 
I was fortunate to be in at the beginning of things that pioneers such as Chris Jones and 
Bruce Archer started. I was fortunate to be in at the beginning of the ‘Design 
Discipline’ at the Open University, and to be faced with the challenge of re-inventing 
design education. I was fortunate to be able to lead the OU's Design Discipline - later to 
become the Department of Design and Innovation - for a long period through the 1980s 
and into the1990s, during which we became one of the leading new departments of 
design in the UK, in both teaching and research. I was fortunate to be able to develop a 
strong working relationship with colleagues in the Faculty of Industrial Design 
Engineering at Delft University of Technology in the 1990s, which opened new 
opportunities for research in design thinking. I was also fortunate to be an editor of the 
journal of Design Studies from its inception, and thus able to encourage, promote and 
disseminate good research. 
Those of us with long memories know that many new techniques, methods and 
approaches in design practice - ranging from design methods to computer modelling 
and virtual reality - originated in design research. It seems that it takes a generation, at 
least twenty-five years, maybe thirty years or more, for the things that perhaps seemed 
'ivory tower' research projects and ideas to become embedded in practice. Usually, the 
practitioners don't realise that what they are doing or using is something that originated 
within the design research community. Often, contemporary observers and 
commentators don't realise that either, because of course the practitioners don't 
reference their work back to its origins.  
However, the aims and objectives of design research are not just focused on 
applications for design practice; there are also many other kinds of achievement of 
which to be proud. Especially, research also feeds into education. One of the significant 
achievements of design research has been what it has contributed to the broadening of 
design education beyond apprenticeship and technical training; the understanding that 
has grown of the nature and relevance of design thinking. Design graduates are now 
better educated; more self-aware about designing and the design process, how to be a 
designer and the contribution designers make to society. Even beyond that, developing 
design as a discipline has made it possible for design to interact with many other 
disciplines, from computing science to cognitive science, anthropology to psychology, 
management to philosophy. 
Looking forward, we could do with some consolidation and focused development of 
what has been achieved in the 50 years of design research. At a pragmatic level, I am 
thinking especially of meta-analyses, review articles, etc., and books that genuinely, 
comprehensively and thoughtfully present the state-of-the art. (There are some books 
with ‘Design Research’ in their titles that are travesties.) In PhD research in design, we 
need better, more focused research training and, instead of seeking novelty, there could 
be some useful attention to either confirming or refuting some of the early, single-case 
studies that are still relied upon as foundational evidence within our discipline. More 
broadly, I think the discipline of design could benefit from a much more progressive 
and coordinated research programme, rather than the fragmentation that seems evident 
today. It needs a solid, collective viewpoint instead of idiosyncratic, personal views of 
what constitutes design research; it needs significant leadership and an honest 
acknowledgement from people within the field that we are all still novices in design 
research. 
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